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Abstract 
The article examines the institutions governing relations between grant using national NGOs 
and grant giving international donors in three regions of Ghana (Upper West, Northern and 
Greater Accra Region). Formal procedural rules and professional norms can be viewed as 
necessary to minimise opportunities for informal patronage, rent-seeking and corruption 
made possible by the unequal access to resources. Qualitative research confirmed that 
friendships originating in kinship and ethnicity, school links and past collaboration can also 
weaken NGO sustainability. But it also highlighted the positive role informal networks, 
connections, personal contacts, friendship and face-to-face contact play in enhancing 
collaboration between donors and national NGOs, building trust and strengthening lines of 
accountability - with non-adherence to shared norms resulting in sanctions and reputation 
loss. These findings echo Eyben (2010) in affirming the positive role of informal relations, and 
highlighting how they can complement formal rules and professional norms governing NGO-
donor relations rather than undermining them. Compared a narrow emphasis on clientelism, 
the research throws a more positive light on the role of informal institutions and provides a 
more nuanced conceptual foundation for assessing ‘formalisation’ as a normative strategy. 
Donors concerned with supporting civil society need to be wary of trying to do so remotely 
and in ways that reduce opportunities for closer interaction and investment in trustful 
relationships.  
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1 Introduction 
 
This article examines the institutions governing relations between donors and national NGOs 
in Ghana. The existing literature on NGOs have mostly focused on formalisation of rules as 
part of the design of donors’ aid chain framed normatively around patron-client relations 
(Wallace et al. 2006). This literature has paid much attention to formal procedural rules and 
professional norms on governance and accountability requirements (see Ebrahim 2003; 
Agyemang et al. 2017) to the neglect of the informal aspects of such relationships. The 
existing literature is silent on how the culture (i.e. the social relations, informal networking, 
values and ideas) that governs donor- NGO relations influences their daily operations and the 
effects of attempts to formalise such relationships (Eyben 2006; 2010; 2011; Yarrow 2011; 
Fechter 2012; Sundberg 2019). In particular, there are relatively little empirical research on 
how informal networks and personal connections enhance collaborations between donors 
and national NGOs from the perspective of sub-Saharan Africa. This article addresses this 
knowledge gap. 
 
In doing so, it seeks to answer the following research questions: How can the culture 
governing donor-NGO relations in Ghana best be described and explained? Who gains and 
who loses from attempts to formalise or strengthen the explicit rules governing donor-NGO 
relations in Ghana? In answering these questions, this article draws on qualitative in-depth 
interviews, life histories and personal experiences of Ghanaian donor representatives and 
NGO staff to illustrate the culture governing their relations1. This article highlights that the 
Ghanaian development sector is characterised by power structures between NGOs and 
donors. This arises because of a limited number of donors who control critical resources 
crucial for the survival of NGOs. Importantly, given the increasing number of NGOs albeit 
fewer number of donors, this presents a challenge to donors about how to allocate their 
scarce resources among relatively potentially abundant NGOs. Understanding the culture 
governing donor-NGO relations provides useful insights into how donors allocate their scare 
resources. 
 
We show that although donor agencies seek to formalise their relations by enforcing formal 
procedural rules and professional norms, Ghanaian donor representatives and NGO workers 
draw on their social relations, shared values and ideas and informal networks in helping them 
allocate resources and manage their development work. By doing so, this article shows that 
personalised relationships, friendships rooted in kinship and ethnic ties, past professional 
experiences and old-school associations are significant elements of the culture governing 
donor-NGO relations. It further demonstrates how personalised relationships within the 
Ghanaian development sector operate alongside explicit bureaucratic and professional rules 
that govern the allocation of donor funding for NGOs. Based on our empirical evidence, we 
argue that formalising donor-NGO relations does not necessarily improve the quality and 
cost-effectiveness of development interventions. Rather rule formalisation creates 
opportunities for the co-existence of personalised relationships and formal bureaucratic 
orders which becomes a strategy for managing and achieving the desired development goals 
by donors and NGOs. Our empirical findings challenge arguments about the culture of 
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unequal donor-NGO relations. In particular, we contest the belief that donors are self-
interested, corrupt institutions and rent-seeking patrons who disburse funds to maximise 
their own benefits while NGOs are complicit in such clientelism to the extent that weak formal 
rules and professional norms allow. We show the limits of such arguments by highlighting 
that personalised relations, contacts and friendships between donor and NGO 
representatives serves as a catalyst for ‘getting things done’. To this end, efforts to promote 
development effectiveness should pay particular attention to the less formalised or 
personalised nature of relations because ‘relationships matter’ significantly for the success of 
development interventions. We argue that it is the personalised nature of relations or what 
Eyben (2010) calls ‘relationalism’ that sustains the existence and effectiveness of the aid 
industry in Ghana. Therefore, investing in mechanisms that promote the practice of 
‘relationalism’ provides enormous benefits for the development sector. Building relationships 
is central to the creation of partnerships that produce meaningful development outcomes. 
 
This article contributes to the empirical literature on donor-NGO relations by showing how 
personalised relationships enhance collaborations between donors and NGOs. In doing so, it 
highlights how informal practices within donor and NGO circles manifest itself and its 
importance for the sustenance of the development sector. Building informal social ties and 
relational resources is a critical strategy for resource mobilisation and NGOs’ operations. We 
show that informal networks and personal connections are strategic responses that help in 
negotiating and manipulating strict donor requirements and conditions which create 
opportunities for influencing donor agendas and policies. Understanding how NGOs use their 
networks and personal connections to navigate the donor landscape is crucial for policy 
deliberation because it provides a strong foundation for appraising the potential of NGO 
leaders and donor representatives to organise in ways that can enhance their agency and 
influence over development policy and practice.   
 
The remainder of this article proceeds in five parts. Following this introduction, Section 2 
discusses formalisation as conceptual framework underpinning this study. This is followed by 
a review of the literature on informal networks among NGOs in Section 3.  The research 
methodology is presented in Section 4. The research findings are presented and discussed in 
Section 5. The last section presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Conceptual framework of formalization  
This article draws on the concept of formalisation in examining the culture that governs how 
development work is managed by NGOs and donor representatives and the effects of efforts 
to formalise their relationship in Ghana. Formalisation provides a useful framework for 
understanding the values, norms and beliefs and how NGO staff use shared norms and trusts 
including social networks and connections in forming collaborations with donors. The concept 
is also used in shedding light on how attempts to impose more explicit order into donor-NGO 
relations produce unintended consequences for development interventions. 
 
While formalisation is not a new phenomenon, it has received an increased attention 
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especially in the public administration literature (Pandey and Scott 2002; DeHart-Davis et al. 
2013; Kaufmann et al. 2018; Borry et al. 2018). Within institutions, formalisation is considered 
as impersonal and relies largely on fixated rules and procedures that structure the behaviour 
of actors. In this article, formalisation is understood as the active process by which a specified 
agency seeks to impose more explicit order onto a system or process. It is defined as the 
‘‘degree to which rules define managerial and employee roles, authority, relations, 
communications, norms and sanctions, and procedures in organisational activities’’ 
(Lakshman 2015: 170). Formalisation therefore is about the extent of explicit formulation of 
norms. It also denotes the intensity of written rules, procedures, instructions and 
communications within an organisation and focuses on their strict application with the aim of 
ensuring predictability and stability (Pandey and Scott 2002; Kaufmann et al. 2018). Formal 
organisations and rules help in structuring collective behaviours and individual actions within 
society (Mica et al. 2015).  
 
Two forms of formalisation exist: job codification and rule observation. Job codification 
focuses on the governance of individual behaviour through the provision of detailed norms 
and rules about how specific tasks are to be performed. Codification takes the form of written 
or formalised rules that enables a common language to be spoken across organisations which 
demonstrates the collective nature of organisational processes (Pandey and Scott 2002). 
Formalised rules also convey organisational legitimacy as it increases the likelihood of 
compliance (DeHart-Davis, 2009; DeHart-Davis et al. 2013). On the other hand, rule 
observation is also about the extent of supervision towards conformance to the standards set 
by job codification (Hage and Aiken 1967). To this end, organisational rule following becomes 
an important aspect of formalisation as it shapes the effectiveness of bureaucratic structures, 
demonstrates the strength of public sector accountability and how transparency and equity 
are delivered (Borry et al. 2018). Within many institutions, written rules a play a critical 
function by virtue of their functional nature and can have organisational and societal benefits 
when pursued through rational means. At the same time, they have the potential of 
producing unintended effects for organisations if they are illogical or burdensome. In this 
regard, formalisation can be enabling and constraining depending on its content and the 
context within which it is applied (DeHart-Davis et al. 2013; Borry et al. 2018). 
Within the aid industry, formalisation of organisational management has received attention 
in the literature (Roberts et al. 2005; Eyben 2010). The emphasis on formalisation is on 
managing for development results and forms an important part of what Eyben (2010) calls 
‘substantialism’. A substantialist world view focuses primarily on ‘pre-formed entities’ and 
attach secondary importance to social relations. This has therefore led to an increasing 
formalisation of relationships between donors and organisations including NGOs embedded 
in the aid chain (Eyben 2010, p. 385). For instance, donor-NGO relations are mostly enforced 
through contractual agreements characterised by several accountability requirements. 
Formalised accountability requirements create opportunity for donors to hold NGOs to 
account for their actions due to the principal-agent problems that confronts donors (Ebrahim 
2003). As Copestake et al. (2016) demonstrate, donors as principals lack information about 
NGOs as agents in terms of their commitment and ability to achieve intended project 
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outcomes.  
Faced with principal-agent problems, donors have resorted to ‘development managerialism’ 
characterised by the application of rational tools for planning and measurement within 
private aid channels (Roberts et al. 2005; Wallace et al. 2006). This is premised on the idea 
that it promotes efficiency, effectiveness and transparency. As part of managerialist thinking, 
formalised relations between donors and NGOs are assumed to help in the prevention of 
financial malfeasance, ensure compliance and produce value for money. The belief is that the 
absence of formalised structures is associated corruption, clientelism, nepotism and a means 
of control (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006). In this regard, formalisation of relations has 
become a mechanism for increasing organisational efficiency and effectiveness. As DeHart-
Davis (2009) highlight, formalisation increases the likelihood for achieving effective 
organisational rules.  
However, formalisation of relations between donors and NGOs increases donors’ power. For 
example, Agg (2006) argues that in order to receive a formalised partnership agreement from 
the Department for International Development (DFID), NGOs had to prove how they could 
contribute to the UK government’s priorities and targets. Similarly, Elbers and Schulpen 
(2013) document power asymmetries in donor-NGO relations where decision-making and 
partnership governance structures were unilaterally set by donors. In addition, due to 
resource dependence, donors unilaterally define accountability requirements and funding 
conditions for NGOs (Ebrahim 2003). This includes the obligatory use of for example, logframe 
as part of funding reporting and accountability requirements. Power relations associated with 
formalised relations undermine transformative learning as it prejudices mutual accountability 
associated with trust-based relations (Eyben 2006). However, the adoption of trust-based 
relations by donors is limited because of their emphasis on substantial approach that focuses 
on cause-and-effect or rational thinking. From a rational choice perspective, developing and 
maintaining relationships between donors and NGOs is considered a transaction cost. 
Importantly, maintaining ‘informal’ relationships goes against the ethos of formalisation and 
rational choice thinking (Eyben 2010).  
Notwithstanding, some authors have argued that informal relations constitute an important 
aspect of donor-NGO relations (Alikhan et al. 2007; Yarrow 2011; Aliyev 2015).  Informal 
relation is understood as ‘‘a form of interaction among partners engaging in dialogue, the 
rules of which are not pre-designed, and enjoying relative freedom in the interpretation of 
their roles’ requirements’’ (Misztal 2000, p. 46). The understanding of informal relations as 
used in this article does not only portray its ‘perceived negative connotations’ including neo-
patrimonialism but also shows the extent to which they can facilitate the processes of ‘getting 
things done’ because they are socially acceptable. In what follows, we review the literature 
on informal networks in the NGO sector. 
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3 Informal Networks among NGOs  
NGOs operate within an institutional environment which consists of the task and general 
environment. The task environment focuses on elements within which NGOs have direct 
contact with while the general is concerned about factors that affect them indirectly. As part 
of the task environment, NGOs have direct relationship with stakeholders which occur at the 
level of formal and informal institutions. To this end, informal networks have become 
important resources employed by NGOs in ensuring their continual survival (Yarrow 2011; 
Aliyev 2015). Informal networks are built on shared norms and values including trust.  
 
Trust is very important for NGOs in their relationship with stakeholders because it determines 
the extent of their resource mobilisation and legitimacy (Keating and Thrandardottir 2017). 
Trust is also critical in helping NGOs build shared sense of norms and values. For this reason, 
social trust between NGOs and stakeholders including donor agencies and local politicians is 
not only maintained through formal contractual agreements, but also informal ties. Trust 
strengthens cooperation among partners because it enhances legitimacy, credibility and 
reputation. It also ensures mutual accountability in networks in achieving collective goals 
(Lyon 2000; Romzek et al. 2012).  
 
Trust-based personal relationships are important among development workers because it 
helps them in negotiating their complex lifeworlds (Hilhorst 2003). For instance, Eyben (2011, 
p. 246) found that trust-based personal relationships were required by development 
professionals in Bolivia ‘‘to take them through the rocks and rapids of negotiating a multi-
donor budget support facility’’. Similarly, Bachmann (2016) illustrates how personal relations 
and interactions between EU diplomats in Nairobi created opportunities for collective 
diplomacy. Recent studies (see Fechter 2012; Heuser 2012) have also shown that social 
relations including friendships and the primacy of the personal among development workers 
facilitates development work. The social and the professional are intertwined in development 
work. For example, Hueser (2012) demonstrates that among foreign and local NGO workers 
in Indonesia, social relations through friendship create a sense of belonginess, helps in 
creating identities and also bridging gaps in knowledge between foreign and local 
development workers.  
 
Informal networks are also crucial for especially international assignees or expatriates 
working in NGOs as they provide informational, emotional, instrumental and financial 
resources in their host country (Claus et al. 2015). Similarly, Yarrow (2011) demonstrates the 
importance of social relations among development workers in Ghana. He maintains that 
informal relations help workers to create formal networks with stakeholders including 
politicians, media and development organisations. Everyday life of development workers 
involves developing informal relations including trusted friendship, family, ethnic and 
religious ties. These are built on trust and self-regulation which results in social interactions 
that are honest in nature (Hilhorst 2003; Romzek et al. 2014).  
 
The examples mentioned illustrate that not all informal relations result in corrupt practices 
Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being Friend or Patron? 
60/2020   Kumi and Copestake 
 
9 
 
because it is directly linked to the way development organisations including NGOs and donors 
operate. The activities of development organisations are sustained largely by informal 
practices that take place on a regular basis but remain largely unnoticed. This is what Hilhorst 
(2003) calls ‘the real world of NGOs’ which is crucial in determining how NGOs survive and 
achieve their missions in an ever-changing operating environment. 
 
This understanding of informal relations is in sharp contrast to the argument by Chabal and 
Daloz (1999) that individuals engage in the work of civil society to further their own interests. 
Similar accounts have been given by Smith (2010) about how personal elites in the Nigerian 
NGO sector engage in development work to further their parochial interests and corrupt 
practices. For these authors, social relations stifle development and by doing so portray a 
negative impression framed mostly as neo-patrimonialism. This Western understanding of 
informal relations fails to appreciate contextual differences between Western and non-
western societies (Ledeneva 2018). However, as some scholars have argued, informal 
networks including friendships are a normal way of organising in many parts of the world 
(Yarrow 2011; Eyben 2011; Harrison 2017; Sundberg 2019). For example, in their study of 
informal contacts and networks among NGOs in Post-Communist Europe, Grødeland and 
Aasland (2011) found in Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania that NGO representatives perceived 
informal practices as part of their culture. They also highlight the importance of informal 
practices and relations in helping people get quick solutions to their problems compared to 
using institutionalised structures. In this regard, informal networks among NGO workers 
become a social norm because it revolves around cultural products such as traditions. 
Similarly, Aliyev (2015) documents the significance of informal networks by NGOs in Georgia 
and Azerbaijan and argues that it helps them collaborate with stakeholders including 
government officials and peer NGOs as well as receiving funding from donors and 
philanthropic institutions. 
 
It is worth noting that reciprocity, moral obligation and affection are important factors for 
building stronger informal networks and relationships. For example, guanxi (i.e. business 
connections and networks) in China has been used by NGO leaders in building their 
organisations.  Ru and Ortolano (2009) maintain that environmental NGOs in China use their 
guanxi in overcoming administrative bureaucracies and challenges associated with registering 
an NGO. In the case of Ghana, Yarrow (2011) highlights how reciprocal assimilation among 
development workers leads to the formation of stronger informal relationships. Informal 
relationships are built around friendship which originates from educational and professional 
backgrounds (Heuser 2012). This leads to the building of personalised trust developed over a 
long period of time. In fact, informal networks among development workers are also 
developed through mechanisms including engagement in sporting, cultural events, during 
implementation of donor-funded projects and participation in political activism (Aliyev 2015; 
Eyben 2011; Yarrow 2011).  
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4 Methodology  
This article is informed by a qualitative research methodology in exploring the culture that 
governs donor- NGOs relations in Ghana. The use of qualitative research was based on the 
need for a deeper understanding and critical insights into the dynamics of the social relations 
existing in the Ghanaian NGO and donor space. This helped in exploring the perception of 
NGO and donor representatives on the importance of their personal connections. This article 
is a by-product of a broader doctoral research which examined the resource mobilisation and 
survival strategies of national NGOs in Ghana (see Kumi 2017). Data collection for this 
research took place between July 2015 and July 2016. The research involved fifty-nine (59) 
national NGOs operating in health, education and agriculture sectors in the Northern, Upper 
West and Greater Accra regions of Ghana.  
 
The selection of the three regions was informed by the following reasons. First the Northern 
and Upper West regions (hereafter, The North) are the most marginalised part of Ghana 
which makes poverty very severe. For example, according to the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey (GLSS) 6, poverty incidence for Upper West and Northern a region stood at 70.7% and 
50.4% respectively (GSS 2014, p. 13). The concentration of NGOs and donors is therefore 
highest in the North because of the high poverty incidence and the peculiarities of 
development challenges. Tamale, the capital of the Northern Region is considered the NGO 
capital of Ghana (Kumi, 2017). Second, the selection of the Greater Accra region was informed 
by its importance as the headquarters of many donor and government agencies. Moreover, 
in terms of geographical coverage, Greater Accra is located in a different agro-ecological and 
climatic zone (i.e. dry-south east coastal plain) and has different degree of urbanisation and 
proximity to donor agencies compared to the North.   
 
Aside from the 59 national NGOs, nine bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, philanthropic 
institutions and international NGOs participated in the research. A criteria sampling was used 
in selecting NGOs and donor agencies2. In total forty-two NGO staff involving executive 
directors, heads of programmes and project officers were interviewed. For donor agencies, 
eleven representatives ranging from Country Directors to Programme Managers and Officers 
were interviewed. In addition, nine key informants including academics, development 
consultants and government officials at the Ministry of Finance, National Development 
Planning Commission and Department of Social Welfare were also interviewed. 
 
Data collection involved the use of life histories, participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews which provided opportunity for exploring and understanding how the relationships 
between NGOs and donor representatives is shaped by their personal and life courses. In fact, 
exploring the life course of NGO leaders and donor representatives provided much insight 
into their social affiliations developed over the years through their engagement in 
development work. As Lewis (2008) highlights, using life histories in third sector research 
helps in providing historical depth and ethnographic details especially as individuals reflects 
on their life and provides a better sense of ‘being there’. More importantly, life histories 
provide valuable insights through its actor-oriented perspective that seeks to reinforce 
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element of agency including how NGO leaders influence donor policies and practices. The 
discussion of structure and agency is very important especially when researching issues of 
social relations and informal networks (Hilhorst 2003). Similarly, life history interviews and 
personal narratives have been used in understanding the motivations for Ghanaian 
development workers (Yarrow 2011).  
 
The semi-structured interviews were made up of open-ended questions and this gave 
interviewees opportunity for expressing their opinions in detail. Gillham (2005) highlights that 
elite interviews be loosely structured because of the sensitivity with the information they 
provide. Interviewing NGO leaders and donors’ representatives on their informal networks 
also raises methodological challenges because they are often associated with clientelism and 
corrupt practices. For this reason, being tactful in approaching interviewees and also building 
rapport was crucial. Although it was explained to interviewees that this research was for 
academic purpose, some were skeptical about our intent of asking questions relating to their 
personal relationships and networks. This is because our research focused on resource 
mobilisation, donor funding mechanisms and relationships with NGOs and donors. Personal 
connections among development workers sometimes create cooperation and tension and 
therefore understanding these issues was critical. In addition, combining semi-structured 
interviews and personal life histories was a useful exercise for the interviewees to open up by 
reflecting on their work trajectory. Given the assurance of anonymity offered to interviewees, 
some were able to voice dissent and became critical of each other which sometimes they 
were reluctant to express through official feedback reporting systems3. This provided the 
opportunity for them to share their negative and positive experiences of informal 
relationships in their daily operations. Aside from semi-structured interviews and life 
histories, one of the authors participated in several meetings and programmes organised by 
NGOs and donors. During such periods, field notes were used in recording events and the 
feelings of participants in their natural contexts. This provided opportunity for self-reflexivity 
during data analysis.  
 
The interview data were recorded and transcribed with the consent of interviewees. These 
were coded in NVivo 10 and analysed using thematic and discourse analysis. The inductive, 
iterative approach to qualitative analysis informed our analysis. Thematic analysis was used 
in used in identifying emergent themes from the data while discourse analysis was employed 
in understanding the nature and how interviewees framed their relationships. In complying 
with ethical requirements, approval for this research was given by the University of Bath 
Ethical Committee. To validate the research findings, the transcripts were sent to 
interviewees for their feedback which was incorporated into the final analysis. This ensured 
data accuracy. In the next section, we present and discuss our key findings. 
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5 Results and Discussion 
5.1 How can the culture governing donor-NGO relations in Ghana best be 
described and explained?  
Personalised relations  
Interview data suggests that the relationship between donor representatives and NGO 
leaders are personalised in nature. This takes the form of friendship which is an important 
inter-personal relation mechanism that facilitates the emergence of cooperation and 
collaboration. Norms of friendship and brotherhood are used in fostering relationships. 
Interviewees explained that were of the view that friendships were developed through ethnic, 
religious and educational ties. Long-standing friendships were developed among Ghanaian 
NGO and donor representatives of the same ethnic background and community of origin who 
shared similar stories of their upbringing. These ethnic affinities were crucial especially in 
getting information on upcoming donor projects which in turn influenced the extent to which 
an NGO leader could develop relationship with donors. Speaking about the importance of 
ethnicity as a mechanism for engaging with donors, an NGO leader in Tamale explained as 
follows: 
In the NGO sector, there are ethnic divisions. You have perhaps a big 
man from the North or your village who works for a donor agency; they 
can give you information on what to develop to get their funding. 
When there are no calls, they know what to tell you to do to get the 
money. So, at the end, they [donor representatives] look within their 
ethnic circles and choose which organisations they want to work with 
(Interviewed on 25th April 2016, Tamale). 
 
The above statement sheds light on the negative aspect of focusing on ethnicity in developing 
collaborations. Ethnicity and tribal affiliations were perceived by interviewees as divisive and 
resulted in allegations of favouritism and nepotism among NGO leaders and donor 
representatives. Nonetheless, the use of kinship ties and social identities was critical for the 
survival of NGOs due to their resource acquisition potentials (Aliyev 2015; Harrison 2017). The 
findings suggest that kinship ties provided the conduit and served as bridges in accessing 
resources within their operating environment. The issue of ‘‘who you know’’ was therefore a 
recurrent theme emphasised in relation to funding applications. However, it was explained 
that this resulted in perceived discrimination in the funding process. A section of interviewees 
argued that some donor representatives had interests in some NGOs because they were 
established by their close relatives and friends which made them use their connections in 
securing funding. This was explained by an NGO leader as follows: ‘‘you establish relationships 
with them and once they have your contact, periodically, they will be sending you funding 
windows and tell you what they expect from the proposal’’ (Interviewed on 1st December 
2015, Tamale).  
 
However, interviewees suggested that NGOs established by ‘cronies’ in anticipation of 
upcoming funding opportunities could not survive for a long time and often collapsed as a 
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result of capacity challenges. An interviewee stated, ‘‘they steal your proposal ideas and give 
it to their friends to establish an NGO and submit funding applications. So, when that funding 
finishes, they cannot write another proposal to submit to a different donor agency. Many 
operate for one or two years and they vanish [collapse]’’ (Interviewed on 6th November 2015, 
Accra). Similar accounts of NGOs being operated by cronies have been reported in the 
literature (see Mohan 2002; Harrison 2017). However, this is also not to suggest that there 
was enough evidence from this research that suggests that Ghanaian NGOs are managed 
through patronage structures to further their own interest. While concerns about interlocking 
donor affiliations were mentioned, it was difficult establishing if indeed these networks were 
used in furthering personal gains because it was difficult to establish such causality. 
Nonetheless, respondents explained that patronage networks have the potential to transform 
the operations of NGOs because it results in perceived discrimination in funding applications. 
 
Some interviewees acknowledged that discrimination exists in the Ghanaian NGO sector 
mainly because of limited funding opportunities and an increasing number of organisations. 
For this reason, discrimination was expected because ‘‘at any point in time, there is 
discrimination everywhere’’ as stated by one NGO staff (Interviewed on 14th March 2016, 
Accra). Discrimination arising from personal connections was raised by NGOs that were 
unsuccessful in their funding applications. For this reason, they suggested that their 
competitors won donor grants based on their social connections and not only the quality of 
their proposal. One NGO leader lamented: 
 
Some donor representatives have established their own local NGOs, 
so they are always looking for support for their NGOs. So, they will 
advertise a call and when you apply, they don’t mind you. But some 
particular NGOs are always getting the funding [….]. So, unless you 
have strong connections, otherwise whatever proposal you write does 
not matter. I must admit it has not been very easy at all (Interviewed 
on 7th January 2015, Wa). 
 
The above statement indicates that despite the explicit formalised, bureaucratic and 
professional rules and norms governing how donors should allocate their funds to NGOs based 
on organisational competencies, track record and compliance with formal application rules, 
interpersonal relationships between donor representatives and NGOs facilitated the selection 
of implementing partners. The findings therefore suggest that relationalism operated 
alongside the bureaucratic or formalised structures put in place by donor agencies. However, 
when asked about personal involvement in funding applications, donor representatives 
dismissed such claims by arguing that ‘‘all NGOs are judged on the same principles rather than 
whom you know’’ (Interviewed on 15th December 2015, Accra). This was unsurprising as 
donors always want to portray themselves as neutral and impartial in their relationship with 
NGOs and intended beneficiaries. Given that the legitimacy of development interventions 
hangs on the perception of their neutrality, some donor staff argued that they do not want to 
be accused of using their personal connections in favouring some NGOs because of its 
potential to affect their credibility and legitimacy. The use of personal connections often 
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brought charges of nepotism, favouritism and reinforcement of clientelistic structures which 
fuels discontent among NGO workers. Similar findings have been highlighted among NGOs in 
India and Nigeria (Smith 2010; Harrison 2017).  
 
This also reflects the argument by Unsworth (2009) about potential barriers including a 
technical managerial approach to development that hinder donors from recognising that 
politics is central to their development interventions. Donors often consider themselves as 
politically neutral partners and have an apolitical imaginary of their development 
interventions. For instance, an interviewee argued that ‘‘our development partners, they are 
also politicians and they wouldn’t want to come and mingle in our issues’’ (Interviewed on 
23rd March 2016, Accra). This was reflected in the explanations given by donor representatives 
who argued that funding proposals were judged using standard criteria where funds were 
awarded on merits. In some instances, independent consultants were hired to evaluate these 
proposals as articulated by the Head of Programmes of a multilateral donor agency: 
 
We have standard criteria which could be referred to as a marking 
scheme and that’s what we use. To ensure integrity and robustness of 
the grant making process, grants are not assessed by our staff alone. 
We have a team of independent assessors alongside the staff. For this 
call, we had six independent assessors and they have a copy of the 
assessment criteria. They are entering their scores of the proposals 
and later they will send them back to us (Interviewed on 1st February 
2016, Accra). 
 
Friendship through old-school links 
Another avenue through which friendships between donor representatives and NGOs leaders 
were was through educational affiliations including school-based networks described by an 
interviewee: ‘‘the fact is that you have school mates who are working in the development 
sector, you develop relationship with them’’ (Interviewed on 25th April 2016, Wa). Friendships 
developed from old school associations were mainly through meetings and reunions. Such 
avenues provided opportunities for building stronger bonds as well undertaking programmes 
that kept or bind interviewees together. Some interviewees explained that school-based 
network meetings served as ‘‘family gatherings’’ where they reunited with old friends to 
‘‘ignite memories of our youthful days’’ (Interviewed on 25th May 2016, Accra). It was also the 
place where vital information and contacts were exchanged.  Strong social ties developed 
from school networks were also crucial in staff recruitment within the Ghanaian development 
sector.  The research data suggests that social events including old-school unions played an 
important role in the development of informal networks among development workers. 
Consistent with the findings of Eyben (2011), social events led to the integration of social life 
into the working practices of donor representatives and NGOs. For example, interviewees 
mentioned several instances where they attended annual meetings and end of year dinners 
which created opportunities for social bonding. Being members of such networks served as 
spatial cleavages within which information about potential funding opportunities and getting 
to know the big men and people in high places were shared. Speaking about the importance 
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of such meetings for their activities, the Director of one NGO added: ‘‘so these [attending old 
school meetings and social events] are some of the informal relations by which most of the 
time, we get things done’’ (Interviewed on 23rd December, 2015, Accra). Another staff added: 
‘‘sometimes we get contacts [with donors] through former school friends working for donor 
agencies [….] some funding opportunities you cannot find them in the newspapers but 
through your contacts’’ (Interviewed on 20th April 2016, Tamale). This was informed by the 
idea of helping a brother which highlights the significance of positional embeddedness in 
which network members enjoy informational and social benefits. The network structure 
provides access to valuable information and appropriate resources which are useful for 
increasing cooperation (Granovetter 2017).  
 
Friendship developed with school mates were perceived differently from those established on 
ethnic and tribal lines because they were national in scope and not confined to specific 
geographical areas. Thus, old school friendships traverse different regions and extend beyond 
ethnic groups. For example, interviewees described about how their school mates came from 
the ten regions of Ghana and most of them were development workers employed in different 
sectors including education, health and agriculture. Emphasis was often given to the social 
diversity within these school-based social networks which provided opportunities for 
members. Some respondents stressed that their school mates were ‘big men’ occupying high-
status positions in donor and government institutions which gave them access to critical 
resources. A respondent described a common narrative by stating that ‘‘the boss was my 
classmate. I went there and told him we need money and immediately he said, come and take 
the forms and submit the application. So, at that level, because I knew him, it was easier’’ 
(Interviewed on 23rd April 2016, Tamale). Another interviewee added: ‘‘for these funding 
opportunities, we were introduced by a friend [school mate] who is a big man now and we 
put in our proposals’’ (Interviewed on 1st April 2016, Accra). These excerpts demonstrate the 
significance of NGO leaders benefiting from their affinity with school mates who occupy higher 
positions in the funding hierarchy. Big men used their social and personal connections to 
operate behind the scene in helping NGOs through their performance of generosity. 
 
It is important to clarify that within school-based networks, the so-called big men used their 
positions of power to help their acquaintances in the NGO sector in securing resources for 
project implementation which benefits the public. This indicates that for NGO-donor 
relationships, big men used their positions not for financial gains but rather to help some NGO 
leaders achieve their goals of promoting development. Thus, ‘big men’ within the Ghanaian 
development sector use their educational capital in facilitating development rather than for 
personal gains. This contradicts earlier studies suggesting that big men use NGOs to further 
their interests (see Chabal and Daloz 1999; Mohan 2002). The findings indicate that Ghanaians 
working as representatives of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies were not motivated by 
greed and self-maximising attitudes that allows only a few elites to benefits from donor funds. 
Rather they used their positions of power in helping their colleague NGO leaders secure 
funding for project implementation which serves the good of the society. As one NGO leader 
explained: ‘‘I told you that getting funding for projects is always about who you know, people 
that you have in high places. If you know someone, you’ve already qualified 50% (Interviewed 
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on 3rd December 2015, Wa).  
 
The rise of school-based networks and its associated ‘big-menship’ also signifies the 
emergence of new forms of ties built around former schoolmates which is a reflection of the 
multiple realities within which development workers are situated. Similarly, Alikhan et al. 
(2007) and Yarrow (2011) highlight how development workers in Ghana drew on their 
friendship developed during school and social activism days in accessing resources for their 
operations. This is an indication that donor relationships are based on informal and 
interpersonal relationships and not only limited to institutionalised business relationships. The 
findings are supportive of current research on the importance of friendship in the creation of 
social identities (Eyben 2011; Fechter 2012; Heuser 2012). The findings on of the use of 
interpersonal relations in resource acquisition also raise questions about the extent to which 
acquiring the latest development jargon helps NGOs to secure funds. In fact, the literature 
highlights that becoming a professionalised organisation and identifying with the latest 
buzzwords and fuzzwords helps NGOs to secure funding (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Roberts et 
al. 2005). However, as our findings show, in the case of the Ghanaian NGOs interviewed, 
developing and sustaining personal relationships with donor representative is a key 
determinant of their ability to secure funding. Our argument is not to downplay the 
importance of ‘formalised application procedures’, however, we emphasise the centrality of 
personal connections in resource acquisition.  
 
Friendship through past professional experiences of implementing projects 
The empirical evidence indicates that friendships developed through historical engagements 
and past professional provided opportunities for collaborating professionally. According to 
one NGO director who used to work for an international NGO (INGO) in Tamale, he always 
drew on his work-related ties with other INGO and donor staff for professional engagements. 
Similar sentiments were shared by other interviewees who argued about the importance of 
maintaining previous work-related ties and experiences. Another NGO leader who works as a 
consultant expressed this same argument by putting it this way: 
 
Who you know matters so much. If you don’t have strong connections 
or you have not worked in the sector before, you won’t get funding or 
donors asking you for collaboration because they want track record. I 
worked for an INGO and had colleagues who are now in big-big places. 
And before that I worked with a consultancy firm that gave me 
exposure which made many people to know me and my experience. 
So, my track record and existing contacts in the field has helped us 
(Interviewed on 12th September 2015, Tamale).  
 
The above statement demonstrates the dynamism associated with the relationships between 
donor representatives and NGOs. This demonstrates that the relations between donor 
representatives and NGO leaders are always in fluidity because they are being reworked 
through their job mobility. When donor and NGO staff change jobs, they carry with them their 
professional networks and connections. In this regard, career friendships are sustained and 
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persist over a long time which often informs current relationship between some donor and 
NGO staff. This finding mirrors Lewis (2008) about how people who worked for Oxfam in the 
past (‘ex-fams’) served as boundary spanners by facilitating relationship building between the 
UK government and the third sector.  
 
In the case of the Ghanaian development sector, such social connections and personal 
contacts are important mediums for sending information about suitable and dangerous 
organisations to collaborate with. These connections although are outside of formal 
procedures, they are critical in helping donors in the choice of partners to engage with. For 
instance, donor representatives often emphasised the importance of communicating among 
friends who shared information and experiences of working with national NGOs. One 
representative recalled: 
 
Sometimes from informal conversations with fellow donors, we have 
a very good idea which NGOs are working here. I may talk to a 
colleague at DANIDA, DFID or Christian Aid that we want to do 
agroforestry, then he will say, talk to these NGOs, they have very good 
record. They are reliable and credible, or they will warn you, be careful 
of these NGOs because if you work with them, they will give you 
problems (Interviewed on 28th April 2016, Accra). 
 
Given that development workers tend to know each other and are sometimes close friends, 
exchanging information was a common phenomenon. This echoes Hilhorst’s (2003) argument 
that development workers often bring their personal contacts and connections to their work 
and blurs the distinction between official and unofficial discourses. As the findings highlight, 
official selection for NGOs involves calls for grant proposals by donors. NGOs could submit a 
‘‘catchy proposal because that is what donors always want’’ (Interviewed on 15th December 
2015, Tamale). However, they might not be able to deliver on the actual project. In this regard, 
using social connections and norms of trust with former donor and NGO colleagues helps in 
verifying and deciding on the right NGO to collaborate with. This produces a complex reality 
and shows how formal and informal processes are interwoven together with regards to 
donors’ selection procedures for partners.  
 
Interviewees also described how formal engagements with some donor agencies evolved out 
of informal discussion and such relations involve elements of reciprocity. Accordingly, 
interviewees suggested that friendship within the Ghanaian development sector revolves 
around reciprocity which helps in deepening relationships. Many interviewees claimed they 
resorted to tactics such as invitation to lunch breaks, dinners, investing time and resources to 
visit each other and also sending souvenirs and Christmas and birthday cards. Other means 
of showing solidarity and reciprocity was through attendance at social programmes such as 
marriage, naming ceremonies and funerals. Some interviewees explained that attending such 
programmes helped in keeping the informal relationships between donor representatives and 
NGO leaders because ‘‘it is those elements that breaks the ice because exchanging one good 
favour is part of the informal relations by which most of the time, we get things done’’ as 
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stated by one interviewee (Interviewed on 3rd May 2016, Wa). The importance of reciprocity 
within social networks reflects Putnam’s (1993) argument that individuals are embedded 
within their social environments influenced by norms of trusts and reciprocity. Direct 
reciprocity ensures the existence of cooperation between NGO leaders and donor 
representatives over longer timespan because they are part of the moral norms of society. 
Having presented and discussed the findings on the institutions governing the relations 
between donors and NGOs, we turn to our second research question. 
 
5.2 Who gains and who loses from attempts to formalise or strengthen the 
explicit rules governing donor-NGO relations in Ghana?  
 
Interview data suggests that informal networks and personal connections among 
development workers are important for the achievement of project outcomes. As part of 
mechanisms for maintaining their relationships, interviewees explained that they had contact 
persons both within NGOs and donor agencies who oversaw project implementation t as one 
project officer puts it: 
 
Being able to have a focal person at the donor office who I can talk to 
and tell that these requirements we’re supposed to adhere to, these 
are the challenges we’re facing. How do you we address it together? 
(Interviewed on 26th February 2016, Accra). 
 
This officer acknowledges the importance of maintaining direct contact and constant informal 
communications with donors because they served as mechanisms for getting access to key 
stakeholders. Many NGO leaders suggested that contact persons at donor offices were well 
connected to key stakeholders such as government officials and politicians. Using diplomacy 
in accessing government officials was a widely shared perspective among donor 
representatives. One donor staff at an Embassy in Accra explained that NGOs and donors have 
different capacities in influencing policies because ‘‘we occupy different seats at different 
tables. I sit here as an officer looking at the technical work, but I also do more of political 
diplomacy. I engage in diplomacy, lobbying and all that just to make things okay’’ (Interviewed 
on 17th May 2016, Accra). This suggests that donor representatives are able to lobby 
governments through diplomatic means but this remains largely limited for NGOs’ leaders. 
For this reason, building informal relations and rapport with contact persons who serve as 
gate keepers provides opportunities for getting access to high government officials.  Doing so 
contributes immensely to how NGOs are able to achieve their project outcomes. Speaking 
about how donors influence government through diplomacy in relation to concerns raised by 
NGOs, a donor staff noted:  
 
We handle issues in very different ways. We engage in diplomatic 
efforts and informal discussions with government officials and discuss 
the issues. That’s our role and we have tried a number of times which 
really saves NGOs much more time because they don’t have such 
diplomatic channels (Interviewed on 13th December 2015).  
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This statement suggests that informal engagements with donor representatives help them to 
lobby governments on behalf of NGOs. This is consistent with Yarrow’s (2011) observation 
that interpersonal relations are used in linking NGO staff to public actors including politicians 
and the media. However, as the findings highlight, donor representatives act on behalf of 
NGOs in promoting the good of society rather than their own self-interests especially when 
engaging government on issues such as NGOs’ advocacy and civic space.  
  
The argument being made here is that personal connections rather than formalised rules and 
procedural norms grant NGO and donor representatives the opportunity for influencing key 
actors like politicians to undertake specific initiatives that benefits entire society rather than 
specific individuals. Interviewees echoed the sentiment that informal relations are critical 
ingredients for getting some donor representatives to act quicker on some decisions or 
initiatives which otherwise they would not if such requests were made only through formal 
procedures because of the bureaucracies involved (Interviewed on 28th January 2016, 
Tamale). Notwithstanding, some interviewees widely claimed that relying too much on 
personal relations often led to allegations of co-optation or NGOs being tagged as donor 
puppets which affected their credibility and legitimacy with intended beneficiaries. This in 
turn negatively affected their survival prospects and potential roles as watchdogs. Some 
interviewees explained that many NGOs due to their close connections with donors are less 
reluctant to critique their relationship even when things are not working rightly. This raises 
questions about the legitimacy of such NGOs because of their inability to represent the views, 
needs and interests of their intended beneficiaries. Such concerns have led to NGOs facing 
crisis of legitimacy which undermines their autonomy (Walton et al. 2016). 
 
It is worth mentioning that although the relationship between NGO staff and their contact 
persons at donor offices is expected to be formal, they extend beyond the formalised lines of 
communication for information exchange. As noted by donor representatives, their 
understanding of the Ghanaian context creates opportunities for engaging in informal 
discussions on project outcomes that were perceived as difficult. This gave them the room for 
manoeuvring and also adapting their requirements to meet NGOs’ needs. In doing so, they 
admitted these informal channels of communications were meant for getting feedback on 
their engagements. Donor representatives and NGO leaders explained that they wanted to 
develop shared visions and a better understanding of their performance on projects outcomes 
together because they had a common interest of improving the lives of intended beneficiaries. 
For this reason, using informal discussions as a feedback mechanism was very helpful. The 
ability of NGOs to use informal discussions through what one NGO director calls ‘‘head-to-
head discussion’’ (Interviewed on 26th May 2016, Tamale) was due to their resource 
interdependency. This helps in negotiating unfavourable funding requirements because 
donors rely on NGOs for achieving their project goals and reach out to their intended 
beneficiaries. Again, NGOs use their local knowledge and embeddedness to influence the 
conditions set by donors. Negotiating donor conditions requires informal conversations and 
relationship building as shown by the following extracts: 
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They have a system in place where you can renegotiate the work plans 
you submitted in your proposal and say that I think the plan we 
presented might be problematic because of factors prevailing in the 
environment. And therefore, we propose we do it this way and they 
allow for that. Sometimes even the deadlines for report submission, 
we also negotiate (Interviewed on 14th January 2016, Tamale). 
 
Having that focal and contact person responsible for the project who 
you’re constantly having interactions with, that’s very useful because 
you develop relationships just beyond the life of project. When you 
have informal relations and you send in a report, you can get feedback 
quickly (Interviewed on 3rd November 2015, Accra). 
 
According to interviewees, having regular informal conversations made it easier for timely 
feedback because as one NGO staff explained ‘‘not all concerns need to be addressed 
formally because ‘‘donors are humans and not buildings who understands realities with NGO 
work’’ (Interviewed on 4th March 2016, Wa). This sentiment was shared by some donor 
representatives who argued that not having informal conversations makes their 
relationships too mechanical where interactions only happened during reporting periods. In 
fact, they explained that face-to-face interactions was faster and better than formal 
reporting especially when concerns need to be raised urgently with NGO leaders and vice 
versa. This happens as donor representatives often visited NGOs during project 
implementation, which creates opportunities for informal engagements that help in 
influencing donor agenda.  This is captured in the following extract:  
 
As part of their [donors] monitoring and evaluation process, they 
would come and visit the organisation and project sites to get a sense 
of what is going on. When they come, we interact informally, and they 
give us their feedback. Sometimes we also negotiate on their 
reporting’’ (Interviewed on 16th May 2016, Accra).   
 
Interview data suggests that interviewees preferred addressing their concerns through 
informal means rather than relying on conventional formal channels. According to some 
interviewees, the aim here was to ensure that they ‘‘do not put each other in a tight corner 
because formal reporting is seen as you’re complaining too much’’ (Interviewed on 12th 
February 2016, Wa). Similar account about how informal feedback mechanisms were used 
by in sharing contextual information with donors has been reported in the literature 
(Agyemang et al. 2017). This indicates that informal feedback compliments formal feedback 
mechanisms. The existence of formal and informal compliant procedures is akin to the 
facilitative behaviours reported by Romzek et al. (2012) in their study of network 
organisational actors. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that sometimes informal relations make donor 
representatives blush over some requirements by becoming more lenient in how they dealt 
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with NGOs not meeting standard procedures. It was also due to their understanding of the 
local context within which NGOs operate. This clearly shows how the development of 
informal relations helps in influencing and shaping the practices of donors. However, the 
ability of NGOs to influence donor requirements through informal means depended on 
organisational characteristics including leadership style and personality of project officers. 
In what follows, we discuss how informal relations are used as accountability mechanisms 
by donor and NGO staff. 
 
Informal relations and accountability 
Evidence from this research shows that outside formal and official reporting requirements, 
NGO leaders and donor representatives dwell on informal relations as accountability 
mechanisms especially for non-performing organisations. There was a shared understanding 
among NGO leaders that they benefited from structured informal interactions and norms 
from donor representatives in supporting their weak governance structures. This occurred 
through regular informal interactions and dialogues which provided opportunities for 
resolving conflicting accountability requirements (Romzek et al. 2012). For instance, an NGO 
leader stressed that some donors prefer more face-to-face discussions rather than 
communicating through official channels such as emails. They explained that there were 
higher chances of misunderstanding messages sent over emails. In this regard, face-to-face 
interactions resulted in better cooperation because such discussions were opened and gave 
a better understanding of what was expected from each partner so that ‘‘you can hold them 
[donor representatives] by their words’’ as one NGO staff stated (Interviewed on 18th April, 
Tamale).  
 
Verbal assurances became informal accountability mechanisms because it helps NGO and 
donor representatives to engage in follow-up communications to ensure that commitments 
made were attained. Face-to-face interactions with contact persons at donors’ office 
according to NGO staff helped in assessing their performance and also ensured that they 
communicated their inability in meeting reporting requirements. This assertion was supported 
by this quotation from a donor staff: 
 
If you’re not able to submit the report, you need to communicate. It is 
a matter of regular communication such as phone calls. Partners need 
to communicate with us if they realise that it will not be possible to 
deliver the outcomes within the project timelines. They either ask for 
a budget extension or for a no cost extension (Interviewed on 14th 
March 2016, Accra). 
 
Informal relations were useful in facilitating committed listening with donors which allowed 
for negotiated accountability. This is in sharp contrast to the findings of Agyemang et al. (2017) 
who found that NGO workers in Ghana were unable to negotiate accountability requirements 
by donors. As the findings in this research demonstrate, interpersonal relationships helped 
NGOs to engage in strategies for influencing donor requirements. In addition, maintaining 
regular communication through face-to-face interactions was useful in in trust and confidence 
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building. The development of trust was identified by interviewees as one of the outcomes of 
their informal networks because it created a sense of shared norms and values. Shared norms 
are informal code of conduct for assessing the behaviour of actors which in turn determines 
their credibility and reputation. It was emphasised by interviewees that informal networks 
were the building blocks for interpersonal trust which also led to mutual accountability 
between donors and NGOs. Trust building was recognised as very important because it 
determined the ability of NGO leaders to offer suggestions for change to donors’ 
accountability requirements. This is akin to the idea of relational embeddedness (Granovetter 
2017). From a relational embedded perspective, trust has multidimensions comprising of 
personal good will trust, personal competency trust and social trust (Eng et al. 2012). 
Interviewees explained trust was developed through frequent direct interactions and 
friendships. Such friendships created opportunities for relying on what one staff calls the 
‘‘goodwill of friends’’ to deliver on project outcomes. In doing so, they believed that their 
friends had the competency to achieve any agreed goals because people can be trusted in 
following rules and requirements. Consistent existing literature (see Lyon 2000; Eyben 2010; 
Romzek et al. 2014), our analysis showed that trust was understood as confidence and 
knowledge of the ability of their partners. Interviewees saw themselves as trusted partners 
which helped in sustaining their relations. Trust therefore served as checks and balances or 
accountability mechanism in sustaining their relationships. This mirrors Lyon’s (2000) findings 
on the importance of trust in sustaining networks among traders in Ghana where he notes 
that traders trusted each other mainly because of the establishment of long-lasting trading 
relationships. A similar finding about the importance of trust-based relationships has been 
reported in the literature (see Eyben 2010). 
 
Directly related to the discussion of trust is reciprocity and favours in networks. Although 
partnership between NGOs and donors is formal, some interviewees stressed that they often 
exchanged in informal favours. For example, NGO leaders explained that they reciprocated 
their donors by recommending fellow NGOs with credibility for future partnerships. They also 
provided background information on potential communities that donors would want to 
undertake future development projects. On the other hand, donor representatives 
reciprocated NGOs through the writing of recommendation letters for grant applications and 
also shared information on potential funding opportunities by other donors as illustrated in 
the following quotation: 
 
Because we have worked for some donors like SNV, UNICEF and 
WaterAid before, at times when a new project is coming, they can 
just recommend you. At times, they can even pre-inform you that 
this grant opportunity is coming, so you are aware and the moment 
it comes, you put in your proposal. Having these organisations as our 
referees has helped us a lot (Interviewed on 22nd April 2016, Tamale). 
 
NGO leaders explained that donor recommendations enhanced their credibility and 
reputation because they were perceived positively by other stakeholders. One respondent 
stated that ‘‘now donors are even recommending us to potential donors, so it has increased 
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our visibility’’ (Interviewed on 4th May 2016, Accra). For this reason, it could be argued that 
adherence to informal accountability mechanisms brought rewards. Reciprocity was also 
expressed through collaborations in consortia. NGO leaders explained that they reciprocated 
good actions through future funding partnership with organisations with perceived limited 
capacity which enhanced their credibility and survival prospects. As in this research, 
exchanging favours helps in strengthening relationships between donors and NGOs which 
results in getting things done.  
 
Despite the positive aspects of reciprocity, there was a widely held perception among NGO 
leaders that reciprocity by donors was much limited. This happened when NGOs freely shared 
information about difficulties faced in the implementation of projects. However, such 
information was sometimes interpreted by donors as failure by NGOs which affected their 
future funding and partnership potentials. Accordingly, donor representatives stressed that 
some NGOs abused the trust they had developed in them and failed to deliver on project 
outcomes. This resulted in sanctions including blacklisting from future funding opportunities, 
termination of existing contracts and relationships, damaged reputation and complete 
avoidance of relationships. The following extracts from an interview with a blacklisted NGO 
explains how sanctions imposed by donors affect resource mobilisation potentials:  
 
I have not really applied for funding from them [donors] because we 
are a bit cautious. We discussed with them and paid the money they 
said we had embezzled, and the contract was terminated. So, I 
particularly became a bit uncomfortable with their funding 
(Interviewed on 29th April 2016). 
 
The above statement indicates that abusing informal relations and accountability 
mechanisms was detrimental to the survival prospects of NGOs. For instance, interviewees 
emphasised that organisations that had failed to demonstrate their trustworthiness found it 
difficult to collaborate with others. Trust serves as the lubricant and the glue that keeps 
relationships together and has become an important attribute for collaboration (Bryson et al. 
2006). During interview, a donor representative shared his experience of working with a non-
trustworthy NGO which has informed their future partnership decision: 
 
Because we don’t want to hang out our dirty clothes in public, we kept 
quiet. But we know ourselves, so next time when there is an 
opportunity; I don’t go near such NGOs because I don’t trust them 
based on our past experience (Interviewed on 12th January 2016, 
Accra). 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that the level of trust-based relationships changes over time 
with experience. The findings clearly demonstrate how shared norms including trust enable 
and constrain informal accountability in donor-NGO relations. Adherence and non-adherence 
to informal accountability mechanisms result in rewards and sanctions including enhanced 
resource mobilisation potentials and damaged reputation respectively. 
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6 Conclusion 
This article has examined NGO-donor relations in Ghana, revealing the importance of informal 
institutions - including friendship, school-based networks and shared norms of trust and 
reciprocity. In so doing, it qualifies the often assumed antipathy between formal and informal 
relations, revealing instead how they work hand-in-hand. This observation challenges a 
normative assumption of the primacy of a formalised relationship between NGOs and donors, 
arguing that this understates the role of informal elements such as personal connections, 
contacts and friendships in ‘getting things to be done’. Again, it shows that while NGO and 
donor representatives work within bureaucratic structures, they do not embrace these 
structures blindly and uncritically; rather they exercise their agency through the use of 
informal and personal connections to influence and work around these structures. Influencing 
donor agenda through personal connections seem problematic because this is often 
perceived to be clientelistic and corrupt. However, that there is no iron law linking informal 
relationships do not necessarily lead to corruption and patronage that undermines 
development. Viewing informal relations as synonymous with corruption presents a partial 
and unduly negative view of the culture governing donor-NGO relations.  
 
We show that Ghanaian development workers, including NGO and donor representatives 
bring their personal connections to their work, including those arising from kinship, ethnic, 
and educational ties. Furthermore, in the complex environments within which these 
development professionals operate, it is often the personal elements (including friendship 
and trust-based networks) that ensure project outcomes are achieved. This supports the 
argument put forward by Eyben (2010) that strong and healthy social relationships need to 
be viewed more explicitly as an integral part of healthy and effective NGO-donor relations. 
This is not to deny the importance of formal rules and professional norms, but to emphasise 
how it is their interaction with informal rules and norms that leads to positive as well as 
negative development outcomes.  
  
This finding can be linked to longstanding discussion of development partnership. Informal 
accountability based on shared norms has the potential to support fairer, more open and 
honest inter-agency relationships underpinned by ideals of peer and downward 
accountability alongside upward accountability. Informal accountability mechanisms are 
complements and not substitutes to formal accountability rules because of their ability to 
reward (through enhanced reputation, information sharing on future funding opportunities 
and collaboration in consortia) and to sanction (through loss of opportunities, termination of 
contracts, severing of relationships and damaged reputation) actors within NGO-donor 
networks.  
 
Our findings have implications for development policy and practice. First, the role of informal 
institutions needs to be made explicit when donors seek ways to improve ‘capacity’, foster 
‘organisational development’ and promote better leadership. Second, a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of informal relationships is also relevant to how donors seek to 
strengthen their own programme management capabilities: in the distribution of centralised 
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and within-country, and in balancing local and international recruitment of staff, for example. 
Third, informal practices affect inclusion and exclusion of both NGOs and individuals from 
networks, consortia and funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. While we acknowledge that the complex nature of the role of NGO leaders and their ability 
to inhabit different lifeworlds by maintaining a wide range of connections with actors such as 
national or local level politicians, donor agencies and community leaders (Hilhorst, 2003), our 
analysis focuses on their relationships with donor representatives rather than politicians or 
community leaders.  
2. The following criteria was used in selecting NGOs: a) The NGOs must have been in existence 
for 5 years and must have had experience with donor funding; b) must have an annual budget 
of not less than GH₵ 20,000 (US$5, 263.15) and at least 4 paid employees; and c) the NGO 
leaders are willing to grant access. The selection criteria ensured that large, medium and 
small-sized NGOs operating at the national, regional and district levels were included in this 
research. For donor agencies, the selection criteria are as follows: a) the organisation must 
be a bilateral, multilateral, international NGO and philanthropic development agency 
providing funding for national NGOs; b) the donor representative must be a key personnel 
(e.g. Country Director, Chief of Party, Programme Director, Programme Officer, Grants 
Manager) with formal responsibility for and/or practical knowledge of NGO funding 
landscape; c) Sampled NGOs must have indicated they have received funding from the donor; 
and d) the donor agency must be active at the time of data collection and willing to be 
interviewed. 
3. It is important to clarify that our understanding of personal relations and how it is applied by 
donors and NGOs focus on how respondents explictly talked about them rather than affording 
it a self-evident and empirical status.  
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